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AN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF ACCOUNTABLE
CARE ORGANIZATIONS: POTENTIAL ABUSES
FROM ALLOWING REDUCED SCRUTINY UNDER
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
PatriciaM Bruns*

I.

INTRODUCTION

According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS"),
health care costs in the United States in the year 2009 totaled $2.5 trillion
dollars, or $8,086 per person, and are projected to increase by 6.1% per year
between 2009 and 2019.' To put this in perspective, the 2009 health care
costs represent an overwhelming 17.6% of the United States Gross Domestic
Product and are expected to reach 19.3% by 2019.2 As part of an effort to
curtail these steadily increasing costs, President Barack Obama signed into
law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("Affordable Care Act")
on March 23, 2010. In particular, section 3022 of the Act encourages
health care providers to form "Accountable Care Organizations" ("ACOs")
in order to participate in the new "Medicare Shared Savings Program."4 The

J.D. Candidate, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, May
2013; B.S. in Business Administration, emphasis in Finance and Economics, The
University of Dayton, 2010. The author would like to thank her friends and family,
especially her parents Elizabeth and Joseph, for their unending support throughout the
writing process. She would also like to personally thank her Expert Readers, Mr. John J.
Miles, Attorney at Ober Kaler, and Mrs. Leigh L. Oliver, Attorney at Hogan Lovells. In
addition, she would like to thank the editors and staff of the Journal of Contemporary
Health Law and Policy for all their help in the completion of this Comment.
1. NHE Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
https://www.cms.gov/nationalhealthexpenddata/25_NHE fact sheet.asp. (last
Apr. 11, 2012, 6:24 AM).
2.

SERVS.,

updated

Id.

3. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119,
395 (2010) [hereinafter PPACA].
4. Id. § 3022 ("[N]ot later than January 1, 2012, the Secretary shall establish a
shared savings program . . . that promotes accountability for a patient population and
coordinates items and services under parts A and B, and encourages investment in
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goal of these ACOs will be to promote collaboration among health care
providers, increase overall efficiency in caring for patients, and reduce the
cost of providing health care to Americans.5 ACOs will consist of
competing providers who will work together to deliver care in a more
coordinated, efficient, and cost effective manner and will "negotiate
contracts on behalf of their participating providers including price terms." 6
These efficiency benefits are at odds with anti-competitive behavior, which
is inherent whenever otherwise competing healthcare providers collaborate.
On October 20, 2011, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"), recognizing
that newly formed ACOs will need guidance in order to avoid price-fixing
violations of the antitrust laws, jointly issued the Statement of Antitrust
Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations
Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program ("Antitrust
Statement").7 The Antitrust Statement contains two particularly important
facets. First, it provides that the antitrust agencies will apply the "rule of
reason" test to joint price negotiations of ACOs with commercial health
plans if they meet CMS's eligibility requirements for participation in the
Medicare Shared Savings Program, relieving their joint negotiations from
per se antitrust challenges. 8 Second, in applying the rule of reason analysis
infrastructure and redesigned care processes for high quality and efficient service
delivery. Under such program-(A) groups of providers of services and suppliers
meeting criteria specified by the Secretary may work together to manage and coordinate
care for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries through an accountable care organization
(referred to in this section as an 'ACO'); and (B) ACOs that meet quality performance
standards established by the Secretary are eligible to receive payments for shared
savings.").
5.

Id.

6. Jeff Miles, Accountable Care Organizations and the Enforcement Agencies'
Proposed Statement of Antitrust Enforcement I (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
7. Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg.

67,026 (Oct. 20, 2011) ("[T]o maximize and foster opportunities for ACO innovation and
better health for patients, the Agencies wish to clarify their antitrust enforcement policy
regarding collaborations among independent providers that seek to become ACOs in the
Shared Savings Program.") [hereinafter Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy].
8.

Id. at 67,027. See generally WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK,

infra note 36.

270

The Journalof ContemporaryHealth Law and Policy Vol. XXVIII:2

to assess the ACO's market power, the Antitrust Statement creates an
antitrust "safety zone" for ACOs with market shares in all the "common
services" it provides that are less than 30%, absent "extraordinary
circumstances."9 The Antitrust Statement further provides that any ACO
may request a voluntary ninety-day expedited antitrust review letter from the
agencies to help assess its potential antitrust liability.' 0
The Antitrust Statement was issued to provide newly developed ACOs
with the "antitrust clarity and guidance" necessary for their participating
providers to create pro-competitive integrated networks rather than risk
engaging in per se antitrust violations when contracting with payers." The
Antitrust Statement applies only to ACOs formed through collaboration
among otherwise independent providers that "are eligible and intend, or have
been approved, to participate in the Shared Savings Program."' 2 In contrast,
it does not apply to other networks that contract with commercial health
plans but do not participate in, or intend to participate in, the Shared Savings
Program.13 Under the Shared Savings Program, ACOs are entitled to share
in the savings to the Medicare program generated by the ACO if they meet
certain quality and savings requirements, in addition to their traditional
Medicare fee-for-service payments. 14 Those CMS eligibility requirements
include:
(1) a formal legal structure that allows the ACO to receive and
distribute payments for shared savings; (2) a leadership and
management structure that includes clinical and administrative
processes; (3) processes to promote evidence-based medicine and
patient engagement; (4) reporting on quality and cost measures;
and (5) coordinated care for beneficiaries. 5

9.

Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,028.

10.

Id at 67,030.

11.

Id at 67,026.

12.

See id. at 67,027.

13.

Id.

14. Medicare Program, Medicare Shared Savings Program, Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,802 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
pt. 425) [hereinafter Medicare Program].
15.

See Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,027.
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Collaboration among competing health care providers inherently raises
antitrust issues, particularly the possibility of horizontal price-fixing
schemes in violation of section I of the Sherman Act, and the potential to
exercise market power by increasing the providers' reimbursement to supracompetitive levels.16 Moreover, the ACOs that constitute single entities,
such as those formed through the merger of all ACO participants, may
violate section 7 of the Clayton Act 7 or the monopolization or attempted
monopolization provisions of section 2 of the Sherman Act.' 8 The primary
issue, though, with ACOs is horizontal price-fixing in violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act given that ACOs are comprised of otherwise
independent providers working together but that have not merged into one
entity.
Horizontal price-fixing agreements result when competitors selling the
same products or services in the same or overlapping geographic markets,
agree, either directly or through a common agent negotiating on their behalf,
on the prices they will charge for their products or services.' 9 ACO
participants-such as physicians, hospitals, and perhaps other providersare encouraged to share information and collaborate with each other in order
to improve patient care.20 By encouraging this collaboration, health care
providers may be incentivized to fix prices artificially in negotiating
contracts with commercial health plans to the detriment of consumers.
Given that ACOs are comprised of otherwise competing providers, the
ACO's actions result in agreements or "conspiracies" subject to section 1 of
the Sherman Act.
When ACOs negotiate prices on behalf of their

16. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); see also Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76
Fed. Reg. at 67,026.
17.

15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).

18.

15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).

19.

See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). A

price-fixing agreement is "a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of
raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity." Id.
20.

See PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3022, 124 Stat. 119, 395 (2010).

21. E.g., N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 356 (5th Cir. 2008)
(holding that a group of independent competing physicians' agreements on price
constituted unlawful horizontal price-fixing) ("[W]hen an organization is controlled by a
group of competitors, it is considered to be a conspiracy of its members.").
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otherwise competing participants, horizontal price-fixing agreements
result. 22
Horizontal price-fixing agreements are typically per se violations of
section I of the Sherman Act. 23 As a result, these types of agreements are
generally presumed to violate section I without proof that they actually
restrain competition, regardless of the participants' intent, and regardless of
any pro-competitive justifications or effects the actions generate.24 If the
participants have sufficiently integrated their operations in ways to achieve
significant efficiencies, such as forming an integrated joint venture, and their
price-fixing agreement is reasonably necessary for achievement of those
efficiencies, the more lenient "rule of reason" standard applies in assessing
their effect on competition. 25 The "rule of reason" analysis requires that a
plaintiff challenging the action must prove that the defendant has market
power and that its effects predominate over any pro-competitive effects the
challenged conduct might purport to have. 2 6 Joint price negotiations by

22. See, e.g., United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 276 (1942) (holding
that a principle fixing prices for otherwise independent agents to sell the principle's
products constitutes unlawful price-fixing) ("[T]he fixing of prices by one member of a
group pursuant to express delegation, acquiescence, or understanding is just as illegal as
the fixing of prices by direct, joint action.").
23. E.g., Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (holding that
price-fixing agreements would be held per se illegal despite the fact that they were
horizontal).
24. E.g., id. ("[T]he anticompetitive potential inherent in all price-fixing agreements
justifies their facial invalidation even if pro-competitive justifications are offered for
some.").
25. See generally Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 23
(1979) (holding that the blanket license in this case was not a naked restraint on trade but
rather increased economic efficiency and rendered markets more competitive) ("[N]ot all
arrangements among actual or potential competitors that have an impact on price are per
se violations of the Sherman Act or even unreasonable restraints.").
26. See generally Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., 386 F.3d 485, 507 (2d
Cir. 2004) ("[U]nder the rule of reason, the plaintiffs bear an initial burden to
demonstrate the defendants' challenged behavior 'had an actual adverse effect on
competition as a whole in the relevant market' . . . If the plaintiffs satisfy their initial
burden, the burden shifts to the defendants to offer evidence of the pro-competitive
effects of their agreement . . . Assuming defendants can provide such proof, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiffs to prove that any legitimate competitive benefits offered by
defendants could have been achieved through less restrictive means.") (quoting Capital
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networks, including competing providers contracting with payers, may or
may not result in per se violations, depending on the degree of their
integration in providing healthcare services and the necessity for the restraint
in providing the groups' services.27
This Comment argues that heightened levels of collusion among health
care providers, as a result of their participation in ACOs, raises antitrust
problems that may be overlooked in the approach taken by the FTC and the
DOJ in the Antitrust Statement. In encouraging the creation of ACOs, the
Affordable Care Act's goal is to reduce costs and improve quality of care to
patients;28 however, this Comment suggests that this invitation for health
care providers to work together, including negotiating prices collectively
with commercial health plans, may, in fact, result in higher aggregate costs
and open the door to antitrust abuse. The antitrust agencies should consider
providing greater explanation for how they choose to define the relevant
market shares for ACOs. Additionally, the agencies should consider
lowering the 30% market share threshold providing a "safety zone"
protection from challenge. Also, given that review by the agencies is not
mandatory, a level of transparency should be required of ACOs. This
transparency could be accomplished by making it necessary for the ACO to
provide information regarding their joint negations to the FTC and DOJ as
they apply for the Shared Savings Program. Mandatory disclosure would
ensure the agencies are able to identify and challenge potential antitrust
concerns before they are implemented. Lastly, the new standards in the
Antitrust Statement are untested. 29 Pursuant to its untested nature, the
agencies should err on the side of caution when defining market shares that
allow ACOs to go unchallenged for antitrust liability.

Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.
1993)).
27. See, e.g., FTC Staff Advisory Opinion to TriState Health Partners (Apr. 13,
2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/090413tristateaoletter.pdf.
28. See Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026, 67,026
(Oct. 20, 2011).
29. Letter from Joseph M. Miller, General Counsel, America's Health Insurance
Plans and Michael Spector, Senior Counsel, America's Health Insurance Plans, to Federal
Trade Commission and U.S Department of Justice (May 31,
2011),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/aco-comments/00109-60306.pdf
[hereinafter Letter
from Joseph Miller and Michael Spector].
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1I.

ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES

A.

Background

The antitrust agencies recognize from basic antitrust principles regarding
price-fixing that anytime health care providers are permitted to collaborate
regarding price, there is potential for harm to consumers "through higher
prices or lower quality of care."30 In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman
Antitrust Act to address these anticompetitive behaviors.31 In particular,
section 1 of the Sherman Act made it illegal to form an agreement that
restrains trade and established price-fixing as per se illegal.
Further, the
Clayton Act of 1914 prohibits exclusive dealings, price discrimination, tying
arrangements, and mergers that substantially reduce market competition.
The potential for reduced competition is very serious, 34 given that ACOs
may be comprised of groups of otherwise competing health care providers
and hospitals working together to coordinate care and negotiate prices for
their patients under the Shared Savings Program. 35 By allowing health care
providers that would otherwise be competitors to collaborate on prices
without closely monitoring such collaboration, the agencies could be
overlooking what might otherwise amount to a horizontal price-fixing
scheme. 36
One of the most crucial distinctions in antitrust law is the difference
between per se and "rule of reason" analyses.37 Certain business practices
are so inherently anticompetitive that they are deemed per se illegal without
any additional inquiry into the actual effect of the practices on the market or

30. See Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,026.
31.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2006).

32.

Id.

33.

15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2006).

34.

See Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,026.

35. Medicare Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,802 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at
42 C.F.R. pt. 425).
36.

See generallyWILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 2:2 (2011).

37.

Id. § 2:10.
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the intentions of the actors in choosing that course of business. 8 A
traditional example of a per se violation is a horizontal price-fixing
agreement. 39 In contrast, the "rule of reason" analysis is far more flexible,
allowing consideration of all circumstances relating to the challenged
business practice in determining if it unreasonably restrains trade. 40
The "rule of reason" analysis begins with a definition of the relevant
market within which the business practices occur.41 If the company has
sufficiently high market shares, typically defined as the power to "control
price or exclude competition," then the "rule of reason" analysis looks to the
"nature of the challenged restraint and its likely competitive effect."4 2 In
sum, the "rule of reason" analysis weighs the anticompetitive effects of the
business practice against the potential pro-competitive efficiencies of the
practice and allows the practice to continue if the latter significantly
outweighs the former.43 This distinction is particularly important in
evaluating ACOs because the Antitrust Statement allows the "rule of reason"
analysis for joint price agreements between competing health care providers
provided that they are "financially or clinically integrated and the agreement
is reasonably necessary to accomplish the precompetitive benefits of the
integration.""
B.

Application of the Antitrust Law to Health Care and Provider
ContractingNetworks

In the landmark decision, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, the Supreme

Court of the United States held that "learned professions" are not exempt
from antitrust violations.45 This decision was one of two decisions that

38.

Id § 2:8.

39.

Id

40.

Id. § 2:10.

41.

Id.

42.

See HOLMES, supra note 36,

43.

Id

44.

See Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026, 67,027

§ 2:10.

(Oct. 20, 2011).
45.

Goldfarb v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975) ("[W]e cannot find support for

the proposition that Congress intended any such sweeping exclusion [for learned
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opened the health care sector to coverage by the antitrust laws.46 As a result,
there has been enforcement of the antitrust laws against hospitals and
physicians over the last thirty-five years.47 The antitrust agencies have
pursued investigations against health insurance plans, physicians, and
hospitals, with many of these investigations resulting in successful
challenges to anticompetitive conduct. 4 8
The seminal antitrust decision on the price-fixing activities of providercontrolled networks contracting with health plans comes from the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Arizona v. Maricopa Medical Society.49
In this case, numerous physicians had formed a physician-controlled
network to contract with health plans on their behalf 5 As part of the
network's operation, the physician participants agreed among themselves on
the maximum prices that they would charge health plans contracting with the
network.5 1 The Supreme Court, in a narrow four-to-three decision, held that
the physician's agreement on maximum prices constituted a per se violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act despite its purported pro-competitive

professions]. The nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary
from the Sherman Act ... [i]n the modem world it cannot be denied that the activities of
lawyers play an important part in commercial intercourse, and that anticompetitive
activities by lawyers may exert a restraint on commerce.").
46. Id. See also Accord Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976)
(holding that even the local activities of health-care providers could affect interstate
commerce to the extent necessary to meet the requirements for an antitrust violation).
47.

See

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: HEALTH CARE DIVISION, OVERVIEW OF FTC

ACTIONS
IN HEALTH
CARE
SERVICES
AND
PRODUCTS
(2011),
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/antitrust/hcupdate.pdf [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF FTC
ANTITRUST ACTIONS]; see also Proposed Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Regarding
Accountable Care Organizations,OKLA. CNTY. MED. Soc'y, http://o-c-m-s.org/proposed(last visited
statement-antitrust-enforcement-regarding-accountable-care-organizations
Oct. 11, 2011).
ANTITRUST

48. See OVERVIEW OF FTC ANTITRUST ACTIONS, supra note 47; see also Thomas
Greaney, Thirty Years of Solicitude: Antitrust Law and Physician Cartels, 7 Hous. J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 189, 190 (2007).

49.

Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).

50.

Id. at 339-341.

5 1. Id.
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effects.52 The Court, however, distinguished the physician's non-financially
integrated network from those "partnerships or other joint arrangements in
which persons who would otherwise be competitors pool their capital and
share the risks of loss as well as the opportunities for profit."53 Thus, the
Court implicitly indicated that the "rule of reason" might apply to joint
negotiations of prices by networks of providers who integrated their delivery
of care by sharing the financial risk of any losses the network incurred.54
Subsequent to the Maricopa County Medical Society decision, a number

of enforcement actions were brought against networks of providers that
jointly negotiated prices with health plans.
Because of this active
enforcement of the antitrust laws against provider contracting networks after
Maricopa County Medical Society, many industry participants, particularly

physicians and hospitals, reached out for more guidance from the antitrust
agencies about the circumstances in which contracting networks were likely
to violate the antitrust laws and face enforcement actions.
The DOJ and FTC provided that guidance with their 1994 Statements of
Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care and its subsequent revisions in
1996. 56 Statement 8 discusses the antitrust principles applicable to Physician
Network Joint Ventures, that is, contracting networks comprised exclusively
of physicians that "collectively agree on prices or price-related terms and
jointly market their services."s Furthermore, Statement 9 discusses antitrust
principles that apply to Multiprovider Networks, contracting networks
comprised of physicians and other types of providers that jointly market
52.

Id. (two justices did not take part in the decision of the case).

53.

Id. at 356.

54.

Id.

55. E.g., Southbank IPA, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 783 (1991) (settled by consent order). The
challenged conduct included that "the physician respondents agreed not to compete with
respect to whether, and on what terms, they would treat subscribers or enrollees of at
least some third-party payors' health care plans." Id. See also United States v. Classic
Care Network, Inc., 1995-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,997 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (settled by
consent decree).
56.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENT OF ANTITRUST

ENFORCEMENT

POLICY

IN

HEALTH

http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0000.pdf
STATEMENT].

57.

Id. at 76.

CARE

[hereinafter

DOJ

(1996),

&

FTC
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their services and jointly contract with health plans.58 Statements 8 and 9
allow for a "rule of reason" analysis of such networks, provided that
integration through the network is likely to result in substantial efficiencies
and that the price agreements are necessary to achieve those efficiencies. 59
Statements 8 and 9 apply the "rule of rule of reason" treatment to both
Financial
financially and clinically integrated physician groups.60
integration requires that the providers in the network accept substantial
financial risk in contracting with health plans. 6 1 They can do this in several
ways, most notably, by their network accepting "capitation" payments-a
set amount of monthly payment for each of the health plan's members. 62
This incentivizes the network physicians to provide the most efficient care,
since they suffer a loss if the cost of caring for the health plan's members
exceeds capitation payments.63 In the alternative, if the capitation amounts
exceed the network's costs in providing care, the physicians stand to profit. 64
Clinical integration, an indistinct concept, is more ambiguous however.
Statements 8 and 9 describe clinical integration as an "active and ongoing
program to evaluate and modify practice patterns by the network's physician
participants and create a high degree of interdependence and cooperation
among the physicians to control costs and ensure quality." 65 Typically, this
is accomplished by the adoption and enforcement of evidence-based clinical
protocols by the network that results in more efficient and higher quality
delivery of care. 66 The difference between financial and clinical integration
is important because ACOs are, in essence, clinically integrated provider

58.

Id. at 134.

59.

See id. at 88-159.

60.

Id.

61.

See

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A

http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/
2-35
(2004),
COMPETITION
040723healthcarerpt.pdf [hereinafter A DOSE OF COMPETITION].
DOSE

OF

62.

Id. at 12.

63.

Id.

64. See id.
65.

See DOJ & FTC STATEMENT, supra note 56, at 90-91.

66.

See A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 61, at 2-37.
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contracting networks.67 The CMS eligibility requirements that an ACO must
meet to participate in the Medicare Shared Savings Program are the same
general types of requirements necessary for a clinically integrated network.6 8
In response to criticism concerning the clarity of clinical integration in the
1996 Statements, the FTC and DOJ clarified their antitrust enforcement
policy regarding ACOs in their 2011 Statement of Antitrust Enforcement
Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the
Medicare Shared Savings Program. 69
III.

DOJ AND

FTC "ANTITRUST STATEMENT" CRITIQUE

Again, the Antitrust Statement provides that the "rule of reason" analysis
applies to the joint negotiations of ACOs meeting CMS's eligibility
requirements that choose to participate in the Shared Savings Program.70 In
determining the potential for antitrust liability of ACOs, the antitrust
agencies chose to differentiate ACOs based on their participants' "common
service" market shares because the higher those shares, all else equal, the
greater probability the ACO will be able to exercise market power.7 In
doing so, the agencies divide ACOs into two groups, those within the
67.

See generally Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026

(Oct. 20, 2011).
68. See id at 67,027. CMS eligibility requirements include: "(1) a formal legal
structure that allows the ACO to receive and distribute payments for shared savings; (2) a
leadership and management structure that includes clinical and administrative processes;
(3) processes to promote evidence-based medicine and patient engagement; (4) reporting
on quality and cost measures; and (5) coordinated care for beneficiaries." Id. See also
DOJ & FTC STATEMENT, supra note 56 ("Such [clinical] integration can be evidenced by
the network implementing an active and ongoing program to evaluate and modify
practice patterns by the network's physician participants and create a high degree of
interdependence and cooperation among the physicians to control costs and ensure
quality. This program may include: (1) establishing mechanisms to monitor and control
utilization of health care services that are designed to control costs and assure quality of
care; (2) selectively choosing network physicians who are likely to further these
efficiency objectives; and (3) the significant investment of capital, both monetary and
human, in the necessary infrastructure and capability to realize the claimed
efficiencies.").
69.

See generally Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,026.

70.

Id. at 67,027.

71.

Id. at 67,028.
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antitrust "safety zone" and those that will receive traditional "rule of reason"
antitrust analysis. 72
A.

Market Power Calculation ("PSA")

The Primary Service Area ("PSA") serves as a surrogate relevant
geographic market used to calculate ACO market shares, and the market
shares serve as a type of proxy to estimate the ACO's market power.73
CMS, as the administrator of the Shared Savings Pro ram, will make public
the data necessary for ACO market share calculation. This calculation will
determine whether the ACO falls within the Antitrust Statement's safety
zone. 75 As the Antitrust Statement notes, the higher the ACO's market
shares, the greater the risk that the ACO will be able to exercise market
power, which may result in anticompetitive behaviors.76 Thus, the higher
the ACO's market shares, the greater the likelihood that the ACO will
reduce quality and choice for Medicare and commercial patients, raise prices
to commercial health plans, and establish barriers to entry for other
potentially more efficient ACOs to join the market.77
The first step in calculating a PSA is to determine the ACO's "common
services."7 These are services, such as urology, provided by two or more

72.

Id. at 67,027-30.

73. Jan P. Levine, Commentators Seek More Clarification and Less 'Regulation'
From the Antitrust Agencies Following the Agencies' 'Proposed Statement of Antitrust
Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations,' PEPPER HAMILTON
(Aug.
15,
2011),
http://www.pepperlaw.com/publicationsarticle.aspx?
LLP
ArticleKey=2172.
74.

Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,031 n.53.

75.

Id. at 67,028.

76.

See id.

77.

Id. at 67,026.

78. Id. at 67,031 ("A service is defined as follows: a. For physicians, a service is the
physician's primary specialty, as designated on the physician's Medicare Enrollment
Application. Each specialty is identified by its Medicare Specialty Code ('MSC'), as
defined by CMS. b. For inpatient facilities (e.g., hospitals), a service is an MDC [ie:
Major Diagnostic Category]. c. For outpatient facilities (e.g., ASCs or hospitals), a
service is an outpatient category, as defined by CMS.").
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ACO participants.79 Thus, if two or more urologists in separate urology
groups are participants in the ACO, urology is a "common service."80 The
second step is to delineate, for each ACO participant-for example, each
urology group-providing a common service, its PSA in providing that
service. The PSA of each ACO participant is "the lowest number of postal
zip codes from which the [ACO participant] draws at least 75 percent of its
[patients]." 8 2 The final step is to calculate the combined market share of the
ACO participants in each common service in each participant's PSA.83
The Antitrust Statement acknowledges that "[a]lthough a PSA does not
necessarily constitute a relevant antitrust geographic market, it nonetheless

79.

Id.

80. See Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026, 67,031
(Oct. 20, 2011).
81. Id. ("Each independent physician solo practice, each fully integrated physician
group practice, each inpatient facility (even if part of a hospital system), and each
outpatient facility will have its own PSA. In addition, each inpatient facility will have a
separate PSA for inpatient services, outpatient services, and physician services provided
by its physician employees.").
82. Id. at 67,028 (citing Medicare Program: Physician's Referrals to Health Care
Entities With Which They Have Financial Relationships (Phase II), 69 Fed. Reg. 16,094
(Mar. 26, 2004)).
83. Id. at 67,031. Step three instructions specify: "Separately for each common
service, calculate the ACO's PSA share in the PSA of each participant that provides that
service if at least two participants provide that service to patients from that PSA. If an
entity owned by an ACO participant provides services in a PSA, those services should be
included in the share calculation regardless of whether the affiliated organization
participates in the ACO. a. For physician services, the ACO should calculate its shares of
Medicare fee-for service allowed charges (i.e., the amount that a provider is entitled to
receive for the service provided) during the most recent calendar year for which data are
available . . . b. For inpatient services, the ACO should calculate its shares of inpatient
discharges, using state-level all-payer hospital discharge data where available, for the
most recent calendar year for which data are available. For ACOs located in a state where
all-payer hospital discharge data are not available, the ACO should calculate its shares of
Medicare fee-for-service payments during the most recent federal fiscal year for which
data are available . . . c. For outpatient services, the ACO should calculate its shares of
Medicare fee-for service payments for hospitals and fee-for services allowed charges for
ASCs during the most recent calendar year for which data are available, or the ACO can
use state-level all payer claims data, if available." Id.
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serves as a useful screen for evaluating potential competitive effects." 84 The
size of the ACO's market shares is dependent upon the relevant geographic
market chosen for purposes of calculating those shares. To use a variable
such as the PSA, which admittedly "does not necessarily constitute a
relevant antitrust geographic market,"85 seems inappropriate. It may result
in either overstated or understated market shares. Further, the use of PSA
calculations could inevitably result in unintended consequences not
stemming from competitive influences. For example, large fluctuations in
PSA shares over short periods of time due to changes in patient
demographics could occur.8 These changes in PSA values would have little
to do with anticompetitive behavior8 8 and further show the inappropriateness
of the variable as a market share calculus. While PSA levels may be a factor
to consider in the overall evaluation, they should not be used as the initial.
indicator of the level of market power of an ACO.
1.

Safety Zone-0-30% PSA

If all the ACO market shares, calculated as described above, are 30% or
less, the ACO qualifies for an antitrust "Safety Zone" under the Antitrust
Statement.89 This safety zone provides that the agencies will not challenge
the ACO absent "extraordinary circumstances." 90 Unfortunately, the
agencies give only a brief indication of what may constitute an
"extraordinary circumstance." 91 The agencies justify this safety zone on
84.

Id. at 67,028.

85.

Id.

86. Letter from Gail K. Boudreaux, Chief Exec. Officer, United Healthcare, to Fed.
Trade
Comm'n
and
U.S.
Dep't
of
Justice
(May
31,
2011),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/aco-comments/00073-60262.pdf.
87.

Id.

88.

Id.

89.

Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,028.

90.

Id

91.

Id.; see also id at 67,028 n.24 ("Extraordinary circumstances could include, for

example, ACO participants engaging in collusion or improper exchanges of price
information or other competitively sensitive information with respect to their sale of
competing services outside the ACO.").
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their belief that it will be unlikely that ACOs with no market shares above
30% will be able to exercise market power and/or successfully engage in
anticompetitive behavior. 92
Any time that a safety zone is established, it should be done with caution
and it should be conservative. The agencies concede that a PSA "does not
necessarily constitute a relevant antitrust geographic market." 93 Therefore,
they should tread lightly when attempting to establish a safety zoneeffectively protecting the ACO from an agency antitrust challenge-when
the variable that provides the safety zone may not be accurate regarding the
ACO's market power. 94 The harm that results from anticompetitive
behavior is extremely damaging to a market and very difficult to reverse
after it has become entrenched in the market.9 5 Allowing a portion of ACOs
to escape automatically an antitrust challenge by relying on a market power
evaluation method that has yet to be tested may reverse the efficiency effects
that the ACOs were designed to create in the first place.
Moreover, PSA calculations are done by the ACOs themselves.96 This
creates an incentive for ACOs to manipulate their market power numbers
when possible to remain in the 30% safety zone. This is plausible because
PSA values can change at any time, given that health care providers can
enter and leave the market at will. 97 ACOs are required to notify the CMS
within thirty days of any additions in their participants, providers, or
suppliers. However, there does not appear to be any particular safeguards
in place to ensure reevaluation of an ACO's PSA should there be a change in
92.

Id.

93.

Id.

94. Id.
95. Letter from Paul W. Dennett, Senior Vice President, Am. Benefits Counsel and
Kathryn Wilber, Senior Counsel, Am. Benefits Counsel, to Fed. Trade Comm'n and U.S.
Dep't of Justice (May 31, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/aco-comments/0004860116.pdf.
96.

See generally Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,026.

97. Letter from the Consumer-Purchaser Disclosure Project to Fed. Trade Comm'n
and U.S. Dep't of Justice (May 31, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/acocomments/00113-60310.pdf.
98. Medicare Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,979 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at
42 C.F.R. pt. 425).
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the market in which they exist. 9 9 If an ACO is acting anti-competitively,
other providers may choose or be forced to exit the market. As other
providers exit the market, the existing ACO's market share will inevitably
increase. During the Antitrust Statement's period of public comment, many
commenters recommended an ongoing program to monitor increases in
market share and its impact on cost to the patient.o If there are no
additional safeguards in place to ensure that ACOs that may have once been
part of the "safety zone" have not begun to acquire market power and are no
longer within the "safety zone,"01 these ACOs may be able to significantly
alter the market free from antitrust challenge.
2.

Voluntary ExpeditedReview

"Newly formed ACOs"102 have the opportunity to seek voluntary review
from the DOJ and FTC regarding their likelihood of raising antitrust
concerns. 103 The agencies have agreed to an expedited review of only ninety
days or less for this evaluation prior to issuing a letter to the ACO regarding
the agencies' level of concern of the ACO's proposed conduct.104 By
allowing themselves only ninety days to analyze an ACO's potential

99.

See generally Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy,76 Fed. Reg. at 67,026.

100. Letter from the Consumer-Purchaser Disclosure Project to Fed. Trade Comm'n
and U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 97 (stating "[iln addition to the screening program
and current antitrust reviews, it is imperative to establish an ongoing program to monitor
the impact of increased market power that could result from ACO formations."). This
letter further argues for a system to "[g]ather data regarding current market shares,
market entries and exits, and pricing trends for the ACOs. This information should be
collected initially in the application process to establish a baseline, and then on an annual
basis to monitor and report publicly on potentially adverse market impacts of ACOs." Id
101.

See generally Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,026.

102. Id. at 67,028 ("Newly formed ACOs' are those ACOs that, as of March 23, 2010,
the date on which the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was enacted, had not
yet signed or jointly negotiated any contracts with private payers, and have not yet
participated in the Shared Savings Program."). The agencies only provide advisory
opinions to proposed conduct, not to conduct that has already been implemented. Thus,
the Antitrust Statement only applies to "Newly Formed" ACOs. Id.
103.

Id. at 67,030.

104. Id.
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antitrust concern,' 05 the agencies may not be able to conduct an in-depth
review of the ACO and truly pinpoint any potential antitrust concerns.106
Conducting an accurate antitrust review requires significant fact-finding
and investigation. For example, as part of the voluntary review, an ACO is
required to submit the following eight pieces of information:
1. The application and all supporting documents that the ACO
plans to submit, or has submitted, to CMS, including a sample of
each type of participation agreement and each type of document
that reflects a financial arrangement between or among the ACO
and its participants, as well as the ACO's bylaws and operating
policies.
2. Documents discussing
a. the ACO's business strategies or plans to compete in the
Medicare and commercial markets, including those relating to the
ACO's likely impact on the prices, cost, or quality of any service
provided by the ACO to Medicare beneficiaries, commercial
health plans, or other payers; and
b. the level and nature of competition among participants in the
ACO, and the competitive significance of the ACO and ACO
participants in the markets in which they provide services.
3. Information sufficient to show the following:
a. The common services that two or more ACO participants
provide to patients from the same PSA, as described in the
Appendix, and the identity of the ACO participants or providers
providing those services.
b. The PSA of each ACO participant, and either PSA share
calculations the ACO may have performed or other data that show
the current competitive significance of the ACO or ACO
participants, including any data that describe the geographic
service area of each participant and the size of each participant
relative to other providers serving patients from that area.
c. Restrictions that prevent ACO participants from obtaining
information regarding prices that other ACO participants charge
private payers that do not contract through the ACO.

105. Id.
106. Letter from John J. Miles, Attorney, Ober Kaler, to Fed. Trade Comm'n, Office
of the Sec'y (May 31, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/aco-comments/0011860314.pdf.
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d. The identity, including points of contact, of the five largest
commercial health plans or other private payers, actual or
projected, for the ACO's services.
e. The identity of any other existing or proposed ACO known to
operate, or known to plan to operate, in any market in which the
ACO will provide services.107
This is a wealth of information that must be reviewed, validated, and
analyzed. In addition, the agencies reserve the right to seek additional
information when necessary, although this does extend the ninety-day period
in which the agency will respond to the request.los Limited by the time
constraint of a ninety-day expedited review may allow potential
anticompetitive conduct of an ACO to go undetected.
Given that the information used in the voluntary review is provided by the
ACO under review,109 it should also be examined with a keen eye towards
potential self-interested statements. Further, this antitrust review is wholly
voluntary. 110 It is highly unlikely that an ACO engaging in anticompetitive
behaviors is going to voluntarily seek expedited review. The Antitrust
Statement provides no additional safeguards above what the agencies have
historically used-for example, waiting for a harmed health plan to
complain before bringing investigation-in reviewing anticompetitive
behavior for ACOs. I
When the Antitrust Statement was originally issued for public comment, it
included a provision mandating review and approval by the FTC and DOJ
for all ACOs with PSA values above 5 0 %.112 While the mandatory review
provision of the then proposed Antitrust Statement has been removed, likely
for good reason, there still should be a level of transparency with the
agencies regarding the joint negotiation practices of ACOs as they are
submitting for qualification to the Shared Savings Program.
This

107.

Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,030-31.

108. See id
109.

Id.

110.

Id.

111.

See id.

112. Proposed Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable
Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg.
21,894, 21,901 (Proposed Mar. 31, 2011).
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transparency should include documentation similar to the information
requested for a voluntary review. Transparency would allow the agencies to
proactively, rather than reactively, address anticompetitive concerns. If the
goals of the Affordable Care Act are realized, there may be a multitude of
ACO formations at the launch of the Shared Savings Program. The antitrust
agencies admit that even if half of the expected new ACOs seek review, the
number of reviews could be as high as 200.113 Without a system in place to
ensure review of these entities, anticompetitive behavior could become
entrenched in the market before the antitrust agencies detect it, if it is
detected at all.
If the antitrust agencies do not identify and prosecute anticompetitive
behavior by ACOs, it is highly unlikely that injured third parties will help
them do so by bringing their own litigation.114 Despite the promise of treble
damages that successful antitrust challenges bring, private litiation has not
been the hallmark of antitrust enforcement in recent years.' 5 While the
reasons are not entirely proven, antitrust scholars suggest that the cause of
this lack of litigation may be the desire to maintain goodwill with providers
in a community or collective action problems among those who have been
harmed.11 6 One may argue that private litigants can just as easily complain
to the agencies and allow them to bring charges, but this will only ferret out
a certain number of problematic ACOs, because not all health plans will
complain. Thus, if the antitrust agencies do not set out a strict enough
standard in their Antitrust Statement to curtail potentially anticompetitive
behavior by ACOs, creating an unintentional loophole that allows for

113. Id. During the proposed/comment period, the statement required that certain
ACO's were to undergo a mandatory review by the Agencies. At that time, the Agencies
calculated the number of ACOs that would seek voluntary and mandatory review. The
mandatory review is no longer applicable, but the estimated number of ACO formations
still applies. The proposed statement noted that "[fjor the purposes of this burden
analysis, we estimate that the number of submissions for expedited antitrust review, both
required and voluntary, will range from roughly one quarter to one-half of all ACO
applications covered by the Policy Statement. This yields an estimated range of 38 to 200
ACO applicants that will seek antitrust review. Erring conservatively, the following
burden estimate will use the upper bound estimate, i.e., 200 submissions." Id.
114.

Greaney, supra note 48, at 198.

115.

Id.

116.

Id.
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evasion from investigation and prosecution, there is little likelihood that
private litigation will fill the enforcement gap."
B.

Applicability to ACOs Contractingwith Commercial Health Plans

The Antitrust Statement applies to ACOs that are formed in order to
Because of the high costs of
participate in the Shared Savings Program."
establishing an ACO, calculating their market shares, and applying to be a
part of the Shared Savings Program, the agencies recognize that health care
providers will be more likely to integrate their care delivery for Medicare
beneficiaries through participation in the Shared Savings Program if they
also can contract with commercial health plans through their ACO.119 As a
result, the Antitrust Statement also applies the "rule of reason" analysis to
the joint negotiations of ACOs participating in the Shared Savings Program
when contracting with commercial health plans if the ACO "uses the same
governance and leadership structures and clinical and administrative
processes it uses in the Shared Savings Program to serve patients in
commercial markets."' 20 In other words, the "rule of reason" analysis
applies where the ACO is sufficiently clinically integrated.
It is
questionable whether meeting the CMS's eligibility requirements is
adequate to show that the ACO is sufficiently clinically integrated. It is also
questionable whether CMS's eligibility requirements are enough to justify
providing a safety zone from antitrust challenge. It is also pertinent to note
that commercial insurance rates and Medicare rates are very interrelated, so
the effect of this program is difficult to determine.
Additionally, the Antitrust Statement makes clear that in calculating their
market shares, ACOs are required to use data provided by CMS that is based
on services provided to Medicare beneficiaries.121 Because ACOs are
allowed to extend their integrated services into the commercial market, they
could be providing services that Medicare seldom provides, such as
"pediatrics, obstetrics, HIV services, and burn unit services"' 22 and therefore
117.

Id.

118. Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026, 67,027 (Oct.
20, 2011).

119. Id. at 67,028.
120.

Id.

121.

Id. at 67,031 n.51-n.53.

122.

Levine, supra note 73.
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lack appropriate data for their market share calculations. As a result, the
ACO may be unable to calculate accurately their market shares for these
services. 3 The Antitrust Statement briefly mentions that for services that
are rarely used by Medicare beneficiaries, ACOs may use "other available
data to determine the relevant [market] shares." 24 The only example the
Antitrust Statement gives of such "other available data" is "data on the
number of active physicians within the specialty and located within the
PSA."l25 This difference in data may lead to inconsistent market shares
because the data is coming from two different sources. Furthermore, this
difference has the potential to make it challenging for the antitrust agencies
to evaluate accurately and consistently the market shares of ACOs.
C.

ACO Review-FTC vs. DOJ

All voluntary reviews of ACO market power and the corresponding
antitrust liability are to be conducted by either the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission. 126 In his dissent in
the FTC vote on the Proposed Antitrust Statement, Commissioner J. Thomas
Rosch discusses that this joint review is quite problematic for multiple
reasons. 127 First, according to Commissioner Rosch, the Antitrust Division
"has far less expertise or experience than the Commission in reviewing the
formation of ACOs or applying the antitrust laws to them."l28 In essence,
Commissioner Rosch is asserting that ACOs will be clinically integrated
networks and that the FTC has more experience in applying the antitrust
laws to clinically integrated networks. 29 In addition, Commissioner
Rosch's view is that the FTC is an independent agency, unlike the Antitrust
Division, and is less susceptible to political pressures, lobbyists, and other

123.

Id.

124.

Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,031.

125.

Id.

126.

See id.

127. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC, DOJ Seek Public Comment on
Proposed Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care
Organizations (Mar. 31, 2011), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/03/aco.shtm.
128.

Id.

129.

See id.
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particular interest groups.' 30 While this is a hotly contested argument, it is
certainly an important consideration in deciding who should analyze ACOs
for antitrust review.
Further, the Antitrust Statement does not specifically provide for a dual
agency review by both the FTC and DOJ.13 1 Either agency can be the one to
review the documentations and issue a letter.132 There is no guarantee that
the way in which one agency interprets the laws is going to be the same way
that -another agency interprets the laws. In practice, one agency may be
more lenient than the other, providing ACOs with anticompetitive intentions
an opportunity to circumvent the review system.
IV.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

Perhaps one of the most controversial facets of the Antitrust Statement is
the use of PSAs as surrogate relevant geographic markets in calculating
ACO market shares. These calculations determine whether the ACO enjoys
safety-zone protection and, for ACOs requesting a voluntary review letter,
are one factor the antitrust agencies will examine in determining whether the
ACO may raise market-power concerns.' 33 The fact that ACOs are to
calculate their PSA values themselves' 34 provides them with opportunities to
either manipulate the calculations or, at the very least, incorrectly calculate
their market share.
During a May 2011 forum held by the FTC to solicit feedback on the then
proposed Antitrust Statement, numerous attorneys and providers with
experience in clinical integration proposed that the agencies be the one to
calculate PSA shares if that was what they intended to use to determine an
ACOs antitrust scrutiny.' 35 Moving the responsibility for the PSA

130.

Id.

131.

See generally Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,026.

132.

See id.

133.

Id. at 67,028.

134. Sarah O'Hara, Reaction to the ACO Antitrust Policy: Report from Last Week's
FTC
Forum,
THE
ADVISORY
BD.
Co.
(May
16,
2011),
http://www.advisory.com/Research/Health-Care-Advisory-Board/Blogs/NetworkAdvantage/2011/05/Reaction-to-the-ACO-Antitrust-Policy-Report-from-last-weeks-FTC-

forum.
135. Id. ("While the FTC, DOJ, and CMS are currently working to provide
denominators for PSA ratios in all zip codes, panelists suggested that they also take the
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calculations to the antitrust agencies would remove the substantial cost
burden on the individual ACOs,136 allowing them to use that cost savings to
further the goals of the Shared Savings Program instead. Placing the
antitrust agencies in charge of calculating PSA values would also ensure the
accuracy and consistency of the data. Further, placing the market share
calculation responsibility with the agencies would enable them to experience
economies of scale by setting up an efficient process to calculate the shares
for multiple ACOs. The ability of the agencies to ferret out any otherwise
undetected anticompetitive actions of ACOs is worth the increased cost
burden that would be placed on the agencies in requiring them to calculate
the market shares. There are costs of implementing any new law, and the
cost of calculating market shares to detect antitrust violations is a necessary
burden that must be accounted for.
While there are proponents for and against using PSA as the indicia of
market power, the antitrust agencies admit that it "does not necessarily
constitute a relevant antitrust geographic market."' 37 The agencies give little
explanation for their choice of the PSA other than that "it nonetheless serves
as a useful screen for evaluating potential competitive effects." 138 The PSA
is an untested market share variable,' 39 and the agencies' off-handed
explanation for its selection is unpersuasive given its significance in
protecting consumers from anticompetitive behavior. The agencies should
consider using small relevant geographic markets until the reliability of the
variable is determined over time. If nothing else, the antitrust agencies need
to provide a greater explanation for their choice of a 75% PSA threshold. 140
An important question is whether the safety-zone 30% threshold is too
high, too low, or just right. If too low, ACOs that do not pose antitrust risk
time to develop the numerators-the billings, inpatient discharges, or outpatient
payments for every Medicare-enrolled provider. While acknowledging this would
require considerable work for the agencies, panelists argued that it would be more
accurate and less onerous than asking providers to perform this calculation themselves.").
136.

Id.

137.

Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,028.

138.

Id.

139.

Letter from Joseph Miller and Michael Spector, supra note 29.

140.

Letter from The Am. Bar Ass'n Sections of Antitrust Law and Health Law to
31,
2011),

Fed. Trade Comm'n and U.S. Dep't of Justice (May
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/aco-comments/00045-60109.pdf.
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will be subject to review. 14 1 If too high, ACOs with the potential to cause
anticompetitive harm will inappropriately enjoy safety-zone protection.
Consumer harm from safety-zone protection for ACOs that are able to
exercise market power is more likely to be significant than harm resulting
from the error of denying safety-zone protection to competitively benign
ACOs.142 Recall that safety zone protection is not something the agencies
have to provide; it is something they have chosen to give. Given that the
final Antitrust Statement makes no provision for mandatory review by the
antitrust agencies,143 lowering the "safety zone" threshold would simply
ensure more ACOs are challenged for anticompetitive practices. 14 4 With the
immense harm that anticompetitive behavior can have in the market once it
becomes entrenched, the cost to evaluate more ACOs for antitrust liability
seems minimal.145
Additionally, the 30% safety zone should be assessed in the context of
past policy guidelines from the antitrust agencies, particularly the 1996
Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care.146 Statement 8
provides a safety zone for financially integrated networks where its
participants contract with health plans exclusively through the network if the
network includes 20% or less of all physicians in a given specialty in the
area. 14 7 Yet, an ACO with exclusive physicians enjoys safety-zone
protection if the market share of its common services is 30% or less.1 The
Antitrust Statement provides no rationale for this change in policy.
Additionally, Health Care Statements 8 and 9 did not contain a safety zone
for clinically integrated networks.149 Statements 8 and 9 only provided a
141.

Letter from Joseph Miller and Michael Spector, supra note 29.

142.

See id

143.

See generally Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,026.

144.

Letter from Joseph Miller and Michael Spector, supra note 29.

145.

Id.

146.

DOJ & FTC STATEMENT, supra note 56.

147. Id. at 79-80.
148. Letter from Joseph Miller and Michael Spector, supra note 29; see also
Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,028.
149. J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks before the ABA
Section of Antitrust Law Fall Forum, Accountable Care Organizations: What Exactly Are
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safety zone for financially integrated networks.150 Thus, under previous
agency policy, ACOs would not have been afforded safety zone eligibility
because they are clinically integrated networks. 5' Given the agencies' past
policy of imposing a 20% maximum safety zone for networks with exclusive
relationships with their providers, the previous lack of safety zone for
clinically integrated networks, and the fact that the safety zone effectively
protects ACOs from challenge by the agencies, a 20% safety zone threshold
seems more appropriate.' 52
It appears that there has been dispute from the beginning as to which
federal agency would be responsible for reviewing the antitrust liability of
the newly formed ACOs as part of the Affordable Care Act.'15 A 2011
article in the New York Times confirms the conflict between the agencies on
who would police the market.154 In allowing both agencies to issue
voluntary antitrust review letters to ACOs, there is an ever present risk of
inconsistent application of the antitrust laws. This fear would be relieved if
only one agency were to take the sole responsibility for reviewing ACOs.
There is evidence that the Federal Trade Commission may be the agency
best equipped to do so. In the mid-1970s, the FTC formed the Health Care
Division, a separate division within the Bureau of Competition at the FTC,
specifically designed to investigate and bring charges against antitrust
violations within the health care field. 1"1 The division currently has over
thirty-five attorneys specifically trained to apply the antitrust laws to health
care providers.156 Although one of the responsibilities of the Antitrust
We
Getting?
14
(Nov.
rosch/1 1111 7fallforumspeech.pdf.

17,

2011),

http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/

150.

DOJ & FTC STATEMENT, supra note 56,

at 79-80.

151.

See Rosch, supra note 149.

152.

Letter from Joseph Miller and Michael Spector, supra note 29.

153. Robert Pear, Health Law Provision Raises Antitrust Concerns, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
9, 2011, at A19.
154.

Id

155. MARKUS H. MEIER ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM'N, OVERVIEW OF FTC ANTITRUST
ACTIONS
IN
HEALTHCARE
SERVICES
AND
PRODUCTS
1
(2011),

http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/antitrust/hcupdate.pdf.
156. Id.

294

The Journalof Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXVIII:2

Division of the Department of Justice's Litigation I Section is to monitor
antitrust in the health care sector, the DOJ does not have a separate division
specifically devoted to health care. Additionally, the FTC has taken a more
active role in bringing antitrust enforcement actions against potential
anticompetitive entities in the health care field. From 1996-2007, the FTC
initiated and settled approximately forty-one actions against networks for
jointly negotiatinf prices while the DOJ has challenged such arrangements
only five times.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission are off to a
good start by issuing the Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy
Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare
Shared Savings Program. ss However, the statement does not lay out a
strong enough framework that is appropriate for the protection of consumers
from the anticompetitive behaviors that are inherent in physician
collaboration. Little explanation is given for the choice of PSA as surrogate
geographic markets.159 This is surprising given the significant weight that is
put upon ACO market share calculations when determining the level of
antitrust challenge that an ACO receives.160 The agencies should consider
lowering the threshold for the safety zone to better coincide with past policy
Given that the safety zone provides a guarantee of no
precedent. 1
challenge, the threshold should be conservative. Additionally, a level of
transparency should be required of ACOs by mandating them to provide
information to the agencies as they apply for the Shared Savings Program to
ensure that the agencies can quickly detect potentially anticompetitive
conduct and take appropriate enforcement actions. This is especially
important given that the Antitrust Statement provides a provision for
voluntary, not mandatory, review by the agencies.

157.

Greaney, supra note 48.

158.
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As the agencies have admitted, the PSA market share calculation is not
necessarily a good indicator of the relevant geographic market. 62In
response, the agencies should err on the side of caution by delineating small
relevant geographic markets until the reliability of the calculation is
determined over time. Without such caution, the harmful effects of higher
aggregate prices for consumers and reduced efficiency commonly associated
with anticompetitive behavior1 63 may go undetected by the antitrust
agencies. By not allowing themselves adequate time to investigate fully
these new physician collaborations' and by allowing ACOs to calculate
PSA shares by themselves,' 65 self-interested and inappropriate
anticompetitive actions may result in higher, supra-competitive prices to
commercial health plans.
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